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Direct central bank interventions remain an important policy instrument used by major central banks
to inﬂuence the dynamic of the foreign exchange (FX) market. In the 1980s and the 1990s, the US
Federal Reserve (Fed) and the Bundesbank relied extensively on unilateral and concerted operations to
counteract what they considered to be undesirable developments in major exchange rates. While the
US and European monetary authorities have become more reluctant to intervene over time, the Bank
of Japan (BoJ) has remained very active. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the BoJ has been present
in the foreign exchange market more than 300 times and has played a major role by conducting very
large-scaled operations (such as those undertaken in June 1998 when the Bank of Japan purchased more
than 20 billion USD on a single day).
Intervening in the FX market is a complex process that displays several dimensions which are not
always easy for researchers to understand. A ﬁrst important dimension concerns the determinants of
interventions. This has been extensively explored in the empirical literature (Almekinders, 1995; Baillie
and Osterberg, 1997; Ito, 2003; Ito and Yabu, 2004; Kearns and Rigobon, 2005; Bernal, 2006 and Bernal
and Gnabo, 2006). The main results suggest that interventions tend to be conducted to counteract large
deviations of the exchange rate from past levels. These studies have also highlighted the existence of
non-intervention bands, suggesting that monetary authorities incur signiﬁcant costs when intervening on
the foreign exchange markets.
Another, less-studied, dimension involves the type of intervention conducted. Basically, when inter-
vening, monetary authorities might or might not wish to conceal their operations. As emphasized by
Sarno and Taylor (2001) and Vitale (2006), central banks’ interventions usually aim to provide market
participants with some private information, and so, according to the signalling theory, the use of secret
operations is puzzling. The BoJ has used secret interventions intensively in recent years, which suggests
that this issue is of much more than purely academic interest. While a couple of theoretical rationales
have been provided to the use of secret interventions (Bhattacharya and Weller, 1997; Vitale, 1999 and
Chiu, 2003), only a few empirical studies have attempted to identify the determinants of this choice. In
particular, Beine and Bernal (2006) have explored this topic by studying the share of interventions by
the BoJ which were hidden from the market in recent years.
A ﬁnal dimension is the detection of foreign exchange operations by market participants. While the
central banks can ensure that the market detects their interventions by conﬁrming their operations, when
it opts for secrecy it cannot be certain that its actions will remain undetected. Beine and Bernal (2006)
have investigated the circumstances in which the market remains unaware of interventions. They suggest
that FX market traders can detect the presence of the central bank more or less easily depending on
the features of the operation (such as the size or the timing). A failure in the strategy of maintaining
secrecy about an intervention the central bank wanted to hide would obviously erode its credibility and
2reputation. Therefore, a good understanding of the features involved in the process of detecting those
operations might be important for central banks’ policy purposes.
Most studies have dealt with these three dimensions separately. One of the primary aims of the
present paper is to consider them as interdependent processes, and to identify the main determinants
of the various outcomes peculiar to the intervention process. Using data on the intervention policy of
the BoJ over the period 1991-2004, we estimate a discrete choice model describing each of the above
dimensions. More precisely, we use a nested logit model that allows to simultaneously identify the
determinants of the intervention activity, the incentives for the central bank to opt for secrecy, and the
variables at stake in the detection of FX operations by market participants.
This approach oﬀers two main advantages that allow some new light to be shed on key elements
of the intervention policy. First, the various dimensions related to the intervention activity are likely
to be highly interdependent. That is, an element related to one dimension of the intervention process
might well inﬂuence the outcome of another dimension. For instance, the fact that the central bank
can intervene with a fairly good probability of not being detected by the market may increase the scope
for intervention. Another implication of the interdependence of these dimensions is that they might be
inﬂuenced by the same set of determinants. An example of this is provided by communication policy.
Oﬃcial statements about the exchange rate policy or the general stance of the FX market can increase
or decrease the use of interventions (depending on whether statements are considered as substitutes
for or complements to actual FX operations). Furthermore, since authorities’ communication strategies
generally aim to increase the transparency of their policy, oﬃcial statements might be expected to lower
the propensity to use secret interventions. The estimation of a nested logit describing the various steps
of the intervention process then allows their interdependence to be taken into account, and leads to a
better understanding of the exchange rate policy.
A second advantage concerns the way we speciﬁcally address the secret intervention puzzle. Two
conditions must be fulﬁlled for an intervention to remain eﬀectively secret: (i) the central bank must
decide to conceal the operation; and (ii) market participants must not detect it. In order to assess the
statistical signiﬁcance of the determinants inﬂuencing the choice of secrecy by the central bank and the
detection process by market participants, it is necessary to make a clear distinction between interventions
the BoJ wanted to make public and those it wanted to keep secret. This is achieved by using auxiliary
information about rumors, as in Gnabo and Lecourt (2005)’s recent work. This procedure overcomes one
limitation of Beine and Bernal (2006)’s work, which was unable to distinguish public interventions from
those which the authorities had failed to keep secret, and had to make an ex ante distinction between the
two sets of explanatory variables. Our approach allows to consider the choice of secrecy made by central
banks and the detection of oﬃcial trades by market participants as diﬀerent steps in the intervention
process. Furthermore, it allows the secrecy puzzle to be considered within the whole set of decisions
3made by central banks when intervening on the FX market.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 clariﬁes a set of useful concepts, while Section 3 reviews
the existing literature. Section 4 presents the nested logit model which allows the intervention policy to
be analyzed as a sequential process. It also discusses speciﬁcation issues. Section 5 gives details of the
data used in the econometric analysis, while Section 6 reports and discusses the econometric results, and
Section 7 presents our conclusions.
2 Some useful deﬁnitions
Before discussing the empirical literature and describing our analysis, it might be useful to clarify the
concepts surrounding interventions on the FX markets. To this end, we present below several useful
deﬁnitions that should help the reader to have a clear overview of the concepts used in this paper.
• An FX intervention carried out by a central bank is a direct sale or purchase of foreign currency
on the spot market that is intended to inﬂuence the value of the exchange rate. This intervention
is unilateral if there is a single central bank present in the market. If two or more central banks
undertake the same intervention (same market, same direction and on the same day) with their
own funds, the intervention is considered coordinated.1
• An oﬃcial intervention is an intervention which is conﬁrmed by oﬃcial data released after
some time lag (usually three to six months) by the central banks themselves. The data allows
interventions that have actually taken place to be identiﬁed.
• A secret intervention is an intervention that the central bank wants to carry out in a discreet
way. By contrast, a public intervention is an operation that the central bank wants to disclose to
market participants, either through the way the orders are given to FX traders or through oﬃcial
statements aimed at drawing the attention of market participants.
• A detected intervention is a central bank intervention (secret or public) which is detected
by market participants (usually FX dealers) the day it is carried out.2 On the other hand, an
undetected intervention is an operation that market agents are unaware of on the day it is
conducted.
Importantly, the distinction between "public" and "secret" interventions relies on the willingness of
the central bank to make the operation known to market participants. This contrasts with the notion
of "detected" or "undetected" interventions which relies on an ex post assessment of the perception of
1Interventions conducted on behalf of other central banks are not considered coordinated. Coordination requires each
central bank to intervene with its own funds.
2Another deﬁnition of a detected intervention is that it is an intervention which is conﬁrmed by oﬃcial data. Our
deﬁnition refers to a short-run notion of detection and secrecy, and is consistent with most studies of secret operations (see,
for instance, Dominguez, 1998).
4these operations by market participants (for instance by newswire reports). This means that a secret
intervention can be detected, despite the eﬀorts of the central bank to conceal it, if FX dealers have an
eﬃcient detection system in place. In other words, the fact that the central bank tries to keep an interven-
tion secret is not suﬃcient to ensure that it remains undetected. The combination of the secret/public
distinction and the detection process leads to a further distinction: detected secret interventions
and undetected secret interventions (also called pure secret interventions). By deﬁnition, public
interventions are always detected.
3 The previous literature
The empirical literature devoted to decisions on interventions can be divided into (i) studies focusing
on the intervention decision itself; (ii) studies rationalizing the use of secret interventions; and (iii)
analyses of the processes by which market traders detect central bank operations. Most of these studies
have dealt with these issues separately, without taking into account their interdependence. One of the
primary aims of this paper is to ﬁll this gap and to identify the main determinants of the various outcomes
of the intervention process. To highlight the contribution of this paper, we ﬁrst brieﬂy review the existing
literature.
3.1 Intervention decisions
Most papers dealing with central banks reaction function (Almekinders, 1995; Ito, 2003; Ito and Yabu,
2004; Kearns and Rigobon, 2005 and Bernal, 2006) derive it from a loss-function minimization program
by assuming speciﬁc processes for the exchange rate dynamic (e.g. random walk or auto-regressive
processes). Losses increase with deviations of the exchange rate from the central bank’s target (several
deﬁnitions have been used, such as the fundamental equilibrium rate or a weighted target derived from
past exchange rate levels). The central bank is also assumed to incur a loss if it faces excessive exchange
rate volatility. The results of these studies indicate quite robustly that intervention policies are designed
to counter large deviations of the exchange rate from the central bank’s target. More generally, there is
considerable consensus that central banks tend to adopt a leaning-against-the-wind strategy to counter
inappropriate exchange rate dynamics. Research on the volatility issue provides less robust results. It
indicates, however, that central banks tend sometime to intervene to calm disorderly markets (Baillie
and Osterberg, 1997). In particular, Bernal and Gnabo (2006) ﬁnd that central banks seem to be
more concerned by increases in the daily volatility rather than by overall volatility levels or regimes.
The weaker evidence on volatility may come from the fact that interventions themselves can stimulate
volatility. Another explanation may be that the volatility measures generally used in empirical studies
are generated regressors (Pagan, 1984).
5Empirical results also indicate that current interventions depend strongly on past intervention activity.
This reﬂects the clustering pattern of foreign exchange operations that can be explained by their related
cost (which is reduced if interventions are conducted several days in a row according to Ito and Yabu,
2004). There is also considerable debate about whether actual and oral interventions are substitutes or
complements. Fratzscher (2004) has shown that oral interventions can be a good alternative to actual
FX purchases and sales, suggesting that these instruments are substitutes. However, Beine et al. (2004)
have shown that some of these statements can be used as eﬃcient complementary tools. More generally,
Bernal and Gnabo (2006) argue that the substitute/complement role of oral and actual interventions
depends on the overall market conditions.
3.2 Secret intervention strategy
Central banks can adopt diﬀerent intervention strategies. In particular, they have to decide whether to
intervene secretly or publicly.3 However the use of secret interventions remains a puzzle, given that the
main theory used to explain how interventions work (the signaling channel framework) fails to explain
their use (Sarno and Taylor, 2001 and Vitale, 2006). Indeed, this theory suggests that an intervention
has to be detected by market participants in order to be eﬀective, as it works by inﬂuencing their
expectations concerning the future value of exchange rates. Nevertheless, theoretical arguments have
been developed to rationalize the use of secret interventions (see, inter alia Vitale, 1999 and Chiu, 2003).
The main reasons suggested involve the inconsistency of an intervention with the objective of reducing
the misalignment, the bad past performance of the intervention activity, and, generally, the low likelihood
of conducting a successful intervention.
A ﬁrst step in testing the relevance of these variables was provided by Beine and Bernal (2006) who
use a single logit approach.4 They analyzed the probability of an intervention being conducted secretly by
assuming they were able to disentangle the determinants of the detection process from the determinants
of the decision to use secret operations. In contrast with Chiu (2003)’s conjecture, their results indicate
that authorities tend to avoid the use of secret interventions when their past interventions have failed to
deliver the intended outcome. On the other hand, the results support the Vitale (1999)’s view, in that
secret interventions tend to be used when the operation runs counter to that which would be needed to
reduce the misalignment.
3Using evidence from recent BoJ practices, Beine and Lecourt (2004) conclude that secret interventions constitute an
important stabilization tool.
4Another interesting approach is provided by Neely (2006)’s updated survey of authorities’ beliefs about interventions.
He asked 27 central banks why they opted for secrecy. Most of the responses appear to be consistent with the variables
tested by Beine and Bernal (2006) and in this paper.
63.3 Detected and undetected secret interventions
A central bank’s adoption of a covert or public intervention strategy has an impact on other characteristics
of its interventions, such as their size, frequency, and the degree of international coordination. In turn,
these elements deﬁne the exact nature of the interventions and determine whether or not the market can
easily detect the central bank’s operations. This arises directly from the fact that by choosing a speciﬁc
disclosure strategy, the central bank explicitly chooses to maximize or minimize the signal sent to the
market.5 This has been discussed by Beine and Lecourt (2004) and Beine and Bernal (2006) who show
that large, frequent, and internationally coordinated interventions have a higher probability of being
detected by the market than small, sporadic and unilateral interventions. According to Neely (2006),
these ﬁndings are strikingly in accord with central bankers’ opinions about the key variables inﬂuencing
the detection process. These ﬁndings thus provide evidence about how central banks should intervene
if they want the signal sent to the market to be clear, strong and eﬃcient with respect to their general
policy. These results also emphasize the existence of conﬂicting interests when FX authorities decide to
conceal their operations. In this case most of the eﬀect occurs through the portfolio and microstructure
channels, so that there is a trade-oﬀ between the authorities’ desire to increase the portfolio eﬀects and
their wish to keep their intervention secret.
4 Econometric approach
4.1 A nested logit model
As discussed in the previous section, the intervention process involves several distinct steps (the inter-
vention decision, the choice of intervention strategy, and the market’s perception) that should all be
incorporated into a single model. Nested logit speciﬁcations (Ben-Akiva, 1973) extend the well-known
multinomial logit model by relaxing the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) hypothesis. The
IIA hypothesis is a central assumption of multinomial logit models which holds that the ratio of the
probabilities of choosing any two alternatives should be independent of the choice set. That is, any
change in an attribute of one alternative must have the same impact on the probability of choosing the
other alternative. This assumption may be restrictive, especially if the decision-taking agent considers
some of the alternatives to be similar. Nested logit models relax this hypothesis by allowing the dif-
ferent alternatives to be organized in groups according to their similarity and by letting within-group
cross-elasticities be larger than those between groups (for a comprehensive discussion, see McFadden,
1984).6
5According to the microstructure approach to FX interventions (see Lyons, 2001 and Evans and Lyons, 2001), the
secrecy of orders ﬂows allows an intervention to be indistinguishable from private trades.
6Hausman and McFadden (1984) propose a test of the validity of the IIA hypothesis. However this test suﬀers from
several drawbacks, and so, we used the Small-Hsiao test instead (Small and Hsiao, 1985).
7Our analysis consists of estimating a three-levels nested logit, in line with the discussion of the
intervention process in the previous section. In such a model, the set of choices faced by an individual
(here the central bank) is partitioned in nests (i = 1,...,N) and sub-nests (j = 1,...,Ni) of alternatives
(k = 1,...,Nij) according to their similarity. Importantly, the utility associated with alternative k in
sub-nest j of nest i not only depends on its speciﬁc attributes, but also on the attributes of the nest and
sub-nest in which it is located. This is illustrated by the random utility function in equation (1) where
˜ Vijk, ˜ Vij and ˜ Vi are the systematic part of the utility respectively associated with alternative k, sub-nest
j and nest i respectively. ǫijk, ǫij and ǫi are independent extreme value distributed error terms with σij,
σi and σ as their respective scale parameters.
Uijk = ˜ Vijk + ǫijk + ˜ Vij + ǫij + ˜ Vi + ǫi (1)
The probability model for this problem is then given by equation (2) where Pijk, Pk|i,j, Pj|i and Pi
denote the probability of choosing alternative k, sub-nest j and nest i respectively.
Pijk = Pk|i,j × Pj|i × Pi (2)
Given the assumed distributions of ǫijk and considering ˜ Vijk = αXijk where Xijk is the vector of
speciﬁc attributes of alternative k and α is a parameter to be estimated, equation (3) is the analytical
form of Pk|i,j (for details, see Maddala, 1983). It indicates that the probability of choosing alternative
k is the ratio of its associated exponentiated utility and the total exponentiated utility of all the other
alternatives within sub-nest j of nest i. σij is a measure of the similarity or independence of alternatives
within sub-nest j (i.e. for a given sub-nest, the contribution of an alternative to the total exponentiated











By deﬁning a pseudo-utility or composite utility function for each sub-nest and nest, it is possible
to derive the analytical forms of Pj|i and Pi. These pseudo-utilities should depend not only on the
speciﬁc attributes of the sub-nest or nest but also on the utility associated with each alternative that
they contain. Generally speaking, the utility of upper levels of the model should encompass the utility of
lower levels. Equations (4) and (5) correspond to these pseudo-utility functions. Iij and Ii are inclusive
values or log-sums that permit the lower level utility to be incorporated into the upper level.7
7The software used to estimate our model (Alogit) uses a diﬀerent deﬁnition of the pseudo-utility functions. It considers
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im). Basically, the diﬀerence lies in the fact that Alogit does
not measure the utilities of upper levels in the same units as those of lower levels, principally for programming simplicity.
However, if needed, consistency of the units can be achieved by modifying the model slightly. This is what we did when
considering the isolated alternatives "No Intervention" and "Public" to be contained in a speciﬁc sub-nest and nest (see
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Hence, setting ˜ Vij = βZij and ˜ Vi = γWi where Zij and Wi are the speciﬁc attributes of sub-nest
j and nest i respectively, and β and γ are the parameters to be estimated, Pj|i and Pi are given by
equations (6) and (7). Again, σi and σ measure the level of independence of the elements of sub-nest j






































Equations (3), (6) and (7) determine the three-levels nested logit model estimated in this paper which
is designed to analyze the sequential structure of the problem faced by central banks when intervening.
This is illustrated in Figure 1 where the top of the diagram (No Intervention v.s. Intervention) describes
the intervention decision and basically corresponds to the estimation of the reaction function of the
central bank. Therefore, all the variables described by the literature on central bank reaction functions
(i.e. the deviation with respect to the central bank’s target, the volatility, the recent intervention activity
and the communication policy of the central bank), designated by W in equation (7), should be included.
Their impact on the intervention decision is measured by the parameter γ. The mid-level layer (Public
v.s. Secret) allows the theoretical arguments for the use of secret interventions to be assessed. The
variables included at this level (i.e. inconsistency with respect to the objective of reducing the deviation
from the central bank’s target, the performance of past interventions, and the likelihood of success) are
denoted by Z and their eﬀect on the disclosure strategy of the central bank is captured by β. Finally, the
bottom level corresponds to the detection of the central bank’s interventions by market participants. The
variables indicated by X (i.e. the size of the intervention, the clustering of interventions, the extent of
international coordination, and the success of an intervention) inﬂuence the ability of market participants
to detect interventions that the central bank wanted to maintain secret. This is measured by parameter
α which allows us to explain how interventions should be designed in accord with the disclosure strategy
of the central bank.
Estimates of α, β and γ are obtained by maximum likelihood techniques.8 These parameters can only
Figure 1).
8Note that, for estimation purposes, only γ contains a constant.
9Figure 1: Problem faced by the central bank
be estimated up to the scale parameters. Since only their ratio is actually meaningful it is then usual to
arbitrarily ﬁx (i.e. normalize) the value of the scale parameters. Alogit performs a normalization "from
the bottom" (Ben-Akiva, 1973 and Ben-Akiva and Bierlaire, 1999).9 That is, it constrains one of the
scale parameters at the bottom level of the model. This dramatically simpliﬁes the estimation process
(Daly, 1987).
5 The data
Data constraints play an important role in assessing the determinants of secret and detected interventions
empirically, since this information is not directly observable. In this section, we detail the building of the
dataset used to estimate the model made up of equations (3), (6) and (7). We start by focusing on the
intervention data, and the way we disentangle ﬁrst secret and public interventions, and then pure secret
and detected secret operations. Then we turn to the description of the data corresponding to variables
X, Z and W.
5.1 Dependent variable
5.1.1 Oﬃcial intervention data
We start with the oﬃcial data on interventions released by the Japanese authorities. This data is available
daily, from 1 April 1991 onwards, on the Japanese Ministry of Finance’s website.10 For each intervention,
the exact date, amount and currencies involved are provided. Our investigation period ends in September
9We are particularly grateful to Cinzia Cirillo for providing us with Alogit codes and precious advices on the empirical
part of the study.
10http://www.mof.go.jp/english/e1c021.htm
102004 and encompasses 343 oﬃcial intervention days. Note that starting with oﬃcial data (i.e. data on
interventions that have actually taken place) allows us to circumvent the issue of spuriously reported
interventions (when market participants erroneously believe that an intervention has occurred). This
contrasts with studies basing the identiﬁcation of interventions on unoﬃcial data sources such as news
reports (see Dominguez and Frankel, 1993 for a discussion of this practice).
5.1.2 Using newswire reports to identify public and secret interventions
The identiﬁcation of public and secret interventions can be achieved by comparing actual and market-
reported interventions (see, inter alia Dominguez, 1998; Beine et al., 2002 and Beine and Lecourt,
2004). While actual interventions can be correctly assessed using oﬃcial intervention data, diﬀerent
techniques have to be used to determine whether or not market participants were informed that the
central bank was in the market. Some previous studies have used reports from ﬁnancial newspapers
(Bonser-Neal and Tanner, 1996 and Dominguez, 1998). This method does not, however, appear to be
particularly accurate. Subsequent studies (Galati and Melick, 1999 and Beine and Lecourt, 2004) have
shown that news reports from wire sources such as Reuters, Bloomberg and Dow Jones capture many
more intervention episodes. This is consistent with Oberlechner and Hocking (2004)’s view that newswire
services are the most important sources of information available to traders and often reﬂect both market
participants’ perceptions and their interpretations.
In this study, we distinguished between public and secret oﬃcial interventions by using information
provided by newswire reports. To this end we used the online database Factiva (including Dow Jones
and Reuters reports) from which news reports can be extracted in real time.11 To ﬁnd reports related
to central bank intervention activity, we used the method pioneered by Beine and Lecourt (2004) and
Gnabo and Lecourt (2005) that consists of searching for a set of relevant keywords within the main core
of the text of the news. Then these reports are classiﬁed according to the degree of certainty of the
information about the occurrence of the intervention. In turn, this criterion is used ﬁrst to decompose
oﬃcial interventions into public and secret interventions, and subsequently to decompose the secret
interventions into pure secret and detected secret interventions. We discuss this in detail below.
Identifying public interventions
According to the signaling channel theory, central bank intervention operations convey a signal about the
future value of fundamentals. The process of disseminating the signal may be divided into three steps.
First, depending on whether the central bank wants its intervention to be perceived or not, some agents
detect the presence of the central bank in the market. At this stage, the signal is only seen by a small
audience, and may not be considered as publicly known (some privileged agents such as major commercial
11Factiva oﬀers a wide choice of search tools and features. For details see http://www.factiva.com
11banks may be explicitly informed of the intervention by the central bank itself). Afterwards, the news of
the intervention is reported by newswire journalists through their personal network of traders, bankers
and brokers in the market. Finally, the news is relayed to the whole market through newswires such
as "BoJ seen buying dollars at around 104.00 yen in Tokyo - Reuters, August 11, 1993", so deﬁnitely
making it public.12
Public interventions are then identiﬁed as those that were ﬁrmly or clearly reported in newswires
(whether through direct detections by market participants or by oﬃcial speeches announcing the opera-
tion).13 Here "clear" means that the report removes any remaining ambiguity concerning the occurrence
of the operation and reﬂects the willingness of the central bank to be seen by the market to be intervening.
Examples of this type of news report are given in Table 1.
Table 1: Examples of news reports used to identify public interventions
Date Sources Relevant text of the news report
September 19, 1994 Reuters "BoJ buys dlrs persistently at around 98.60 yen"
September 6, 1995 Dow Jones "Early Tokyo: dollar surges after BoJ buying"
April 10, 1998 Reuters "Dollar down sharply vs. yen on BoJ intervention"
June 21, 1999 Reuters "Dollar climbs amid BoJ seen continuing to buy dlrs above
Y122- bankers"
June 21, 1999 Dow Jones "N.Y. Early: Dollar up vs. Yen After BoJ intervenes"
September 17, 2001 Dow Jones "Dollar rises near to Y118 on BoJ FX intervention"
October 14, 1999 Dow Jones "BoJ conducts Yen-selling intervention"
Note: Reports in this table indicate that the market clearly knew that an intervention was taking place in
the market.
Identifying secret interventions
A central bank can also decide to step into the market without drawing traders’ attention to its action.
Several strategies are available in order to keep an intervention secret (see Beine and Bernal, 2006 for
details). For instance, the central bank can intervene in a discreet way by using unilateral operations and
low amounts. It can also choose to operate with unusual partners (for example through major foreign
banks or brokers). Nevertheless, this can be detected by traders or bankers who suspect that the central
bank has placed orders. In turn, these traders might report the news to the market. That is, the central
bank’s intention to keep its operations secret is not suﬃcient to ensure that market participants do not
detect them. Therefore, secret interventions have to be further split into "pure secret interventions"
(i.e. interventions that the central bank managed to keep secret) and "detected secret interventions"
(i.e. interventions that were detected by market participants despite the central bank’s eﬀorts to conceal
them).
Secret interventions are deﬁned as those for which there was either no report at all or a report with
12Dominguez (2003) suggests that this process may take approximately 15 minutes.
13Keywords such as "BoJ", "Bank of Japan" and "interventions" were used to identify clear reports of interventions (i.e.
reports with a high degree of certainty).
12a high degree of uncertainty.14 More precisely, "pure secret interventions" are secret interventions which
were not detected by the market, i.e. for which there were no news reports of the intervention at all.
Conversely, "detected secret interventions" are secret interventions which were detected by the market:
that is for which there was a highly uncertain news report about the intervention. Table 2 provides
examples of this type of news report. Given their degree of uncertainty, these news reports can also
be called rumors of intervention (Gnabo et al., 2006).15 That is, the market suspects that the central
bank has intervened, but is not absolutely certain. Importantly, while we do not explicitly analyze the
process through which rumors of intervention spread among FX dealers, we use this type of information
to make a distinction between interventions which are clearly perceived by the market and those which
are only guessed at by FX traders. This distinction between two types of secret intervention (pure secret
interventions and detected secret interventions) is an important contribution of this work, and contrasts
with previous empirical studies.
Table 2: Examples of news reports used to identify detected secret interventions
Date Sources Relevant text of the news report (classiﬁed as rumors)
March 3, 1995 Dow Jones "Though traders couldn’t conﬁrm the BoJ intervention, several said
they were positive the central bank stepped in the market stealthily at
regular intervals Friday between 95.40-.50 yen"
February 22, 1996 Reuters "U.S. currency traders remain watchful of central bank intervention to support
the U.S. dollar. After the Bank of Japan was believed to have been in
the market buying U.S. dollars Thursday"
May 21, 2003 Reuters "Asia Forex -2: Dlr underpinned by rumored covert MoF bids"
October 29, 2003 Dow Jones "In early New York trading. the dollar was trading at 108.04 yen. slightly
above its latest three-year low below 107.90 yen. with traders suspecting the
Bank of Japan might be quietly preventing further losses. Market
sources said the central bank may have been selling yen for dollars in
Asian trade but this could not be conﬁrmed"
October 29, 2003 Dow Jones "Dollar climbs amid suspicion of BoJ Intervention /NEW YORK – The
dollar edged higher against its major rivals consolidating gains as suspicions
intensiﬁed that the Bank of Japan had intervened covertly to weaken
the yen"
November 18, 2003 Dow Jones "Several traders suspected the Bank of Japan acting on behalf of Japan’s
Ministry of Finance was intervening covertly by selling yen around 108 yen
to keep the dollar from breaking into a free fall"
February 20, 2004 Reuters "It also broke above Y109 Friday for the ﬁrst time since early December, helped
by what traders have cited as covert dollar-buying by the Bank of Japan
through agent banks"
Note: Reports in this table clearly indicate that the market does not know clearly whether an intervention
was taking place in the market, whereas oﬃcial data ex post shows that it was the case.
14Newsreports with a high degree of uncertainty can be easily recognized as they generally contain words such as "likely",
"believed", "may have/think", "rumor", "unconﬁrmed", "suspected/speculation" and "covert".
15We exclude reports of interventions occurring on days when no oﬃcial interventions were in fact carried out (i.e. when
the market mistakenly believed that the central bank had intervened). Such reports are called false reports.
135.1.3 Summing up
Table 3 shows the number of oﬃcial interventions (as indicated by the Japanese Ministry of Finance
itself) that were conducted over the period of interest. The methodology described in the previous
section allows us to determine that 212 of the 343 oﬃcial interventions were public (i.e. clear reports
were found suggesting that market participants knew an intervention had been conducted) while 131
were secret (i.e. either no report indicating that an intervention had been conducted could be found or
the existing report did not exhibit a suﬃcient degree of clarity). Among these secret operations, the
Japanese authorities actually managed to conceal its operations on 75 occasions and failed 56 times.16
Table 3: Type of BoJ intervention 1991-2004
Trading days Oﬃcial Reported Secret
Public Undetected Detected
3498 343 212 75 56
Note: The table reports the number of trading days, the number of
oﬃcial interventions, those the BoJ wanted to make public and those
it wanted to conceal. The latter are further split into those which
were detected by the market and those which remained undetected
5.2 Explanatory variables
We turn now to the choice and measurement of the explanatory variables. These are summarized in
Table 4 and discussed in more detail in the following sections.
5.2.1 Empirical counterparts of the intervention decision, W
The extensive literature on why central banks use FX interventions has been reviewed in several recent
surveys (e.g. Sarno and Taylor, 2001). Speciﬁc studies involving the BoJ include Ito (2003), Ito and
Yabu (2004) and Bernal (2006), among many others.
Exchange rate variation
Like other central banks, the Bank of Japan is reported to lean against the wind (i.e. to try to reverse
previous undesirable exchange rate changes). Ito (2003) observed that the BoJ intervened to stabilize the
spot exchange rate changes with respect to short-, medium- and long-term deviations. To capture this
behavior, we use past exchange rate variations observed at one-day, one-month and one-year frequencies.
16Galati and Melick, 1999 also extract perceived interventions of the BoJ over the 1993-1996 period. They use reports
extracted from the Nexis-Lexis database.A cross-check between our ﬁndings and the ones of Galati and Melick, 1999 shows
that both databases were quite eﬀective in capturing the reported interventions. Over this period, only one intervention
(on the 3rd of November 2004) classiﬁed as secret in our data was reported by the Lexis-Nexis database. Conversely,
3 operations that were considered unreported in the Lexis-Nexis database were classiﬁed as public interventions in our
dataset. We are grateful to Gabriele Galati for sharing his database with us.
14Table 4: Empirical measures of the explanatory variables (W, Z and X) for central bank’s interventions
Variables Deﬁnition
W (intervention decision)
dev short Absolute level of short-term deviation in percentage
dev medium Absolute level of medium-term deviation in percentage
dev long Absolute level of long-term deviation in percentage
mis Absolute level of misalignment in percentage
misdum 1 if there is a large deviation between the current exchange rate and its funda-
mental value
statement 1 if authorities made a statement expressing some discomfort with the exchange
rate or conﬁrming/discussing the intervention on the day of the operation
interventiont−1 1 if there was an oﬃcial intervention the day before
RVt−1 Exchange rate realized volatility of preceding day, estimated at the end of the day
Z (choice of secrecy)
leaning 1 if the intervention tries to reverse recent exchange rate trend
previous reported success 1 if the last detected intervention was a success
inconsist 1 if the intervention direction is inconsistent with the reduction of the exchange
rate misalignment
sum statement Number of verbal interventions from the authorities signaling a discomfort with
the exchange rate in the 5 days before the intervention
X (detection process)
amount Amount invested in the daily intervention
coord 1 if intervention is concerted
cluster 1 if there is at least one detected intervention over the last 5 preceding days
success 1 if the intervention moves the exchange rate in the desired direction
Three variables, denoted dev short, dev medium and dev long, were then built to reﬂect the size of
the (absolute) deviation of the current exchange rate from the previous day, the past one-month moving
average, and the past one-year moving average. The variables capture the dynamic of the exchange rate
around some implicit short-, medium- and long-term target respectively (see Almekinders and Eijﬃnger,
1996; Ito, 2003 and Ito and Yabu, 2004). Since interventions are supposed to inﬂuence the exchange rate
level, these variables may suﬀer from simultaneity problems if the contemporaneous exchange rate level st
is used. Therefore, our measure is corrected by using the one-day lagged JPY/USD rate (st−1) instead of
the current rate. From an economic point of view, this shift is meaningful, since the central bank should
presumably face administrative or political costs before implementing an intervention (Almekinders, 1995
and Ito and Yabu, 2004), so that a small delay between the decision to intervene (based on the exchange
rate deviation, for example) and its implementation may be expected. In practice the variables are
computed as follows:




where st denotes the log of the JPY/USD rate at the close of the New York market (21 GMT +1),
and i is the time horizon in trading days (i=2, 21 and 260).
15Exchange rate misalignment
FX interventions are also supposed to reduce the deviations of the exchange rate with respect to some
fundamental value (i.e. to minimize the degree of currency misalignment). The BoJ is charged with this
speciﬁc goal.17 We used a speciﬁc measure of the misalignment to test whether the intervention activity
responded to deviations of the exchange rate from its fundamental value.
The degree of misalignment (denoted mis) of the exchange rate level is measured by computing
the size of the (absolute) deviation of the current rate (more precisely st−1 to control for simultaneity
issues) from the equilibrium exchange rate. For the equilibrium rate we used that computed by Bénassy-
Quéré et al. (2004) to reﬂect the level needed for a global equilibrium between the G-20 economies.
The equilibrium level of the JPY/USD exchange rate is computed annually, so, to obtain daily values we
interpolated between the two end-of -year values.However, this variable can suﬀer from non-stationarity.18
To allow for this, as an alternative used in a robustness check analysis, we constructed another measure
of misalignment (denoted misdum) which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 on days of high
misalignment and 0 otherwise. We consider the 10% of days with the highest positive misalignment and
the 10% of days with the highest negative misalignment as high misalignment.
Volatility
Although there is no explicit volatility target, the goal of "calming disorderly markets" is frequently used
by oﬃcials to justify interventions. We included a measure of exchange rate volatility to test to what
extent this actually inﬂuences the authorities’ behavior.
As suggested by Andersen et al. (2002), we use the realized volatility (denoted by RVt). This is
a consistent estimate of the integrated (latent) volatility and is less subject to the issue of generated
regressors (Pagan, 1984) than parametric estimates of the volatility (such as GARCH estimates). In
practice the realized volatility for day t is computed by sampling the intra-daily data at a high frequency
and cumulating the square products of the relevant returns over a speciﬁc horizon (here a day). If m






Since interventions are also known to raise volatility, we used the one-day lagged realized volatility.
17The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law stipulates that the "Minister of Finance shall endeavor to stabilize the
external value of the yen through foreign exchange trading and other measures" (Article 7, Section 3). (http://www.boj.
or.jp/en/type/exp/faqkainy.htm)
18The mis variable is obviously non-stationary if there is no tendency for the exchange rate to revert to the equilibrium
value. It should also be stressed that, to the best of our knowledge, the consequences of non-stationarity in limited-
dependent variable models (such as the nested logit model) has received very little attention. Therefore, the alternative
measure of the exchange rate misalignment is only included in the robustness analysis.
16This should be a good approximation, given the volatility clustering usually observed for exchange rates
(Andersen et al., 2001).
Statements
Statements made by Japanese oﬃcials and representatives of the BoJ are also included in our model
as they can interact with actual interventions. The role of statements has been studied by several
authors including Fatum and Hutchinson (2002) and Jansen and de Haan (2005). Basically, oﬃcial
statements can be regarded as a complementary or substitute tools for FX operations. Fratzscher (2004)
argues that oral interventions can be an alternative to physical sales or purchase of foreign currency.
Policymakers can try to regulate their currency by expressing to the market their views regarding the
exchange rate value or the usefulness of interventions. Beine et al. (2004) nevertheless also found support
for a complementary role for contemporaneous statements. By clarifying the goal of interventions and
the context in which those operations were conducted, monetary authorities can magnify the signal
conveyed by actual operations. More generally, however, Bernal and Gnabo (2006) established that only
in extreme cases are ﬁnancial operations accompanied by contemporaneous statements.
Two types of statements are included in our analysis: (i) those giving pieces of information about the
future exchange rate policy (i.e. statements informing the market of the authorities’ view of exchange
rates level or their volatility); and (ii) those clearly indicating the possibility of a future intervention which
may be seen as threats to intervene (see Fatum and Hutchinson, 2002). A dummy variable (statement)
is used to indicate whether such statements occurred on a given trading day. We also built another
variable (called sum statement) to capture the number of oﬃcial statements issued during the ﬁve days
preceding an intervention operation. This variable may be seen as an indicator of the state of the recent
transparency policy.
Lagged intervention
Finally, to capture the time dependency generally observed for actual central bank interventions, the
ﬁrst lag of an intervention is included (interventiont−1). This captures the clustering nature of central
bank interventions over time. The literature usually explains this feature by the existence of "political
costs" associated with the intervention decision process (Almekinders, 1995 and Ito and Yabu, 2004).
As documented by Ito (2003) and Gnabo and Lecourt (2005), this approach has been widely used by
Japanese authorities during the last decade. As a matter of fact, the likelihood of an intervention by the
BoJ when there had been an intervention on the previous day was over 60% between 1991 and 2004.
175.2.2 Empirical counterparts of the choice of secrecy, Z
The decision to intervene secretly rather than publicly has been rationalized by a few authors. In their
empirical paper, Beine and Bernal (2006) review various arguments in favor of secrecy. In this paper,
we have basically used the same variables, and we invite the interested reader to refer to Beine and
Bernal (2006) for additional discussion of their rationale. Note that in his updated survey, Neely (2006)
investigates the same underlying reasons for opting for secrecy.
Inconsistent interventions
An inconsistent intervention is an operation that attempts to move the exchange rate in the "wrong"
direction. The concept of wrong direction is of course not a natural one. For instance, inconsistency might
occur when the central bank targets a diﬀerent value from the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate
(Vitale, 1999). These arguments have been developed within the microstructure approach to exchange
rates that relies on the twin assumptions of agents’ heterogeneity and information asymmetry. In that
framework, the secrecy of order ﬂows allows trading by the central bank to be indistinguishable from
private trading, and the central bank may then target an exchange rate that diﬀers from the fundamental
one (Lyons, 2001, Evans and Lyons, 2001).
The inconsist variable was introduced to capture the inconsistency of an intervention. It is a dummy
built by comparing the sign of the misalignment of the exchange rate with the sign of the oﬃcial in-
tervention (sale or purchase), and takes the value 1 when the BoJ intervenes in the opposite direction
to that needed to reduce the misalignment (e.g. when the BoJ buys JPY when it is overvalued or sells
JPY when it is undervalued) and 0 otherwise. As an alternative, we consider the interaction between
the degree of misalignment and the inconsistency dummy. This variable (denoted inconsist×mis) aims
to give more weight to inconsistent policies occurring during periods of large over- or undervaluation of
the exchange rate.
Previous success of interventions
The previous success of FX operations can be seen as a measure of the credibility of a central bank. As
emphasized by Dominguez and Frankel (1993) and Chiu (2003), a low level of credibility or a previous
failure to move the market in the desired direction might persuade the central bank to opt for secrecy.
Indeed, using secret interventions would allow the central bank to avoid a further deterioration of its
perceived ability to achieve a speciﬁc goal or to avoid signiﬁcant increases of the exchange rate volatility.
Interestingly, central bankers themselves seem to think that the failure of previous interventions tends to
favor the use of secret operations (Neely, 2006). Alternatively, in the case of a previous reported success,
and when the current context appears less favorable, the central bank might also want to intervene
secretly to preserve its credibility. Therefore, credibility, as measured by the performance of previous
18interventions, exerts an ambiguous theoretical inﬂuence on the use of secret operations.19
To assess the impact of the eﬀectiveness of past interventions, we built a variable denoted previous
reported success that takes the value 1 if the last detected intervention succeeded in moving the exchange
rate in the desired direction. It is worth noting that we restricted our analysis to detected interventions.
Traders might well be unaware of (undetected) interventions conducted during the past few days. Obvi-
ously, the failure of these operations would not jeopardize the central bank’s credibility and, so, on this
theory, would not inﬂuence the strategy for future interventions.
Leaning-against-the-wind
In the noise-trading channel theory, a secret intervention can mitigate bandwagon eﬀects (Dominguez
and Frankel, 1993). Indeed, the secrecy of these order ﬂows and the resulting increase in volatility might
restore a two-way risk and lead market participants to consider exchange rate ﬂuctuations as purely
endogenous to the market (Hung, 1997). Secrecy ensures then that the intervention works through a
pure portfolio eﬀect, and that market participants will not react to the mere fact that the central bank
is leaning against the wind (perverse signaling eﬀect). In this context, leaning-against-the-wind behavior
can encourage secret operations.
These noise-trading arguments (Hung, 1997) ) were considered in our analysis by taking account of
whether the central bank has exhibited leaning-against-the-wind behavior. A variable (denoted leaning)
was built by comparing the sign of the intervention with the average sign of the last ﬁve daily exchange
rate returns. It takes the value 1 when the intervention goes in the opposite direction to the recent
exchange rate trend and 0 otherwise. We ﬁnd that about two thirds of Japanese interventions were of a
leaning-against-the wind type.
5.2.3 Empirical counterparts of the detection process, X
Several variables have already been identiﬁed by Beine and Bernal (2006) as major determinants of
the ways in which FX traders detect central bank operations. Nevertheless, as already discussed, that
study relies on the validity of an ex ante decomposition between Z and X. One of the purposes of the
nested logit approach adopted here is to assess the robustness of the previous ﬁndings by decomposing
the observed outcomes by decision levels. Beine and Lecourt (2004)’s preliminary analysis also provides
some clues as to which variables inﬂuence the probability of detecting the presence of the central bank
in the market. The relevance of these variables has been conﬁrmed by Neely (2006)’s recent survey of
central bankers beliefs (see in particular Table 3 of his analysis). These determinants mainly concern
features of central bank interventions. However, they also deal with market conditions.
19More generally, central bank practices suggest that the performance of past interventions might inﬂuence a central
bank’s decision about its intervention policy. Results of the survey conducted by Neely (2001) indicate that a central
bank’s trading is inﬂuenced by the response of exchange rates to its previous interventions.
19Coordinated interventions
Coordination between two or more central banks is expected to increase the visibility of any operation.
As documented by Beine and Lecourt (2004) the proportion of unreported concerted interventions is low.
This is consistent with the fact that coordination is expected to increase the probability of detection by
most central banks (Neely, 2006).20
A dummy variable (denoted coord), taking the value 1 if the intervention is coordinated and 0
otherwise, was introduced. An intervention is considered coordinated if two or more central banks
intervened on the same day in the same market and in the same direction. In this paper, as our focus
is on the JPY/USD market, we only consider coordination between the BoJ and the Fed. We use the
oﬃcial data of the Fed to identify these days.
Amount invested in daily interventions
The size of an intervention is expected to inﬂuence the extent to which traders can detect the presence
of the central bank. Indeed, central bankers consider the size of their interventions to be one of the
most prominent features inﬂuencing the detection process (Neely, 2006). The daily amount is therefore
expected to inﬂuence the rate of detection of interventions by the market positively. In theory, the daily
size of interventions not only reﬂects the size of the order ﬂows given by the central bank but also their
number. However, this information is unavailable for most central bank operations, including those of the
BoJ. Therefore, in this study, the variable amount only reﬂects the total daily amount of an intervention
in billions of JPY.
Cluster of interventions
Detected interventions in the days preceding an intervention should raise traders’ awareness of the pres-
ence of the central bank in the market. Empirical reaction functions (Almekinders, 1995; Ito, 2003 and
Ito and Yabu, 2004) suggest that the probability of intervening is higher when the central bank has
intervened in the previous few days. This ﬁts with the cluster behavior of central bank interventions
that has been documented in numerous studies. The existence of recent previous interventions is also
mentioned by central bankers as a key variable for the detection of FX operations (Neely, 2006). We
built a variable (cluster) that takes the value 1 if there was at least one perceived intervention during
the ﬁve days preceding an intervention operation.
20It could also be argued that an agreement between several central banks to intervene at the same time reﬂects their
willingness to send a strong signal to the market. The use of secret interventions would be inconsistent with such an
international agreement.
20Success
Finally, the success of an intervention can also inﬂuence the extent to which this intervention is detected.
Dominguez (2003) provides a stunning example of this by looking at the eﬀect of the Fed’s intervention
on May 31, 1995. The ﬁrst order by the Fed resulted in the DEM/USD rate jumping by more than 2%,
drawing the attention of traders and triggering newswire reports. Subsequent trades by the Fed on that
day were therefore easily detected.
In this study a given intervention is considered successful if it moved the exchange rate in the desired
direction. Although restrictive, this deﬁnition is consistent with the main objective of the BoJ over our
period of investigation. We compared the sign of the exchange rate return between day t − 1 and day t
with the sign of the intervention occurring on date t. Variable success takes the value 1 if a purchase
(sale) of yen led to an appreciation (depreciation) of the yen.21
6 Econometric results
In order to assess the relevance of the nested logit framework described in the previous sections, we
estimated a multinomial logit model along with the nested logit itself.The signiﬁcance of inclusve values
of the nested logit model as well as the likelihood ratio tests between the two models can be used as a
useful check of the relevance of the nested logit structure. The estimates of both models are shown in
Table 5. Column (1) reports the estimates of the multinomial logit while Columns (2), (3) and (4) give
estimates of the full, semi-parsimonious and parsimonious nested logit models. Some robustness checks
were also conducted and these are reported in Table 6. First, we used a dummy variable (misdum) to
capture large degrees of misalignment as a way of accounting for the non-stationarity of mis (Column
(1)). Second, an alternative measure of the inconsistency of the exchange rate policy (inconsist × mis)
was introduced as a determinant of the use of secret interventions so as to give more weight to large
deviations of the exchange rate from the equilibrium level (Column (2)). Finally, the contemporaneous
and past oﬃcial statements were introduced into the second level instead of the ﬁrst one, to capture the
role of the communication policy (Columns (3) and (4)).
The results deﬁnitely support the nested structure of the model. All the Small-Hsiao tests reject the
validity of the IIA assumption, indicating some similarities among the alternatives. 22 Moreover, the
nested logit model outperforms the multinomial logit, as suggested by the signiﬁcance of the inclusive
values (Θ1 and Θ2) as well as by the large increase in the log-likelihood.23 The idea of interdependent
21This variable uses a contemporaneous version of the success of a FX operation. This contrasts with the
previous reported success variable used to explain the choice of secrecy.
22These tests were conducted on several estimated models. We ﬁrst tested the IIA assumption on the full model involving
all three levels. Then, we considered sub-models with either the ﬁrst or the last two levels. In most cases, the p-values led
to a clear rejection of the IIA hypothesis. These results are not reported here for the sake of brevity but are available upon
request.
23It is noteworthy that both Θ1 and Θ2 are greater than 1. According to McFadden (1984) they should be less than 1
for the nested logit to be consistent with the random utility maximization program which usually underlies such models.
21sequential steps in the intervention procedure rather than independent processes is thus supported.
Importantly, the nested logit framework implies that some of the estimates of the multinomial logit
might be subject to speciﬁcation bias. This is important since for a (small) subset of variables, opposite
signs between the two models are obtained, stressing the importance of our new approach for policy
evaluation.
First level : intervention reaction function
For the sake of interpretation, it is important to mention that the underlying utility of the ﬁrst level is
related to the non-intervention outcome. In other words, positive (or negative) coeﬃcients imply that
an increase in the explanatory variable tends to decrease (increase) the probability of intervention.
Our results indicate that an increase in the misalignment of the exchange rate tends to induce the BoJ
to be more active on the FX market (mis has a signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient in Tables 5 and 6). This
result does not seem to be driven by the non-stationarity of mis as we obtain similar results by using a
dummy variable (misdum) to capture large currency misalignments (see the upper panel of Table 6). In
contrast, our estimates do not support the idea that the BoJ reacts systematically either to variations
of the exchange rate from past values (dev short, dev medium and dev long are not signiﬁcant) nor to
exchange rate volatility (RVt−1 is signiﬁcant in the multinomial logit but not when a nested structure is
imposed). This result is consistent with Ito (2006)’s claim that, on average, central banks in general and
the BoJ in particular do not worry about volatility. This is also consistent with Galati et al. (2006)’s
results.
Interestingly, oﬃcial statements (statement) by the central bank are found to be positively related to
the probability of intervention. This supports the view that this instrument can be used as a complement
to central bank operations (Beine et al., 2004). That is, statements accompanying interventions help to
clarify the message embodied in these operations. By informing the market about the authorities’ view
of exchange rate levels or volatility, or by indicating the possibility of a future intervention, statements
permit the BoJ to amplify the results of its operations.
Not surprisingly, past interventions (interventiont−1) are found to be one of the main determinants
of the BoJ reaction function. This ﬁnding is fully in line with most other studies and is consistent with
previous research describing the administrative and political costs of interventions (Ito and Yabu, 2004)
and indicating that once the monetary authorities reach agreement on what threshold to defend, they
may conduct several interventions in a row. As subsequent interventions do not require any further
political bargaining, they are easier (and less costly) to implement.
However, the model presented in this paper is not entirely a random utility maximization one. While the upper levels
clearly describe the behavior of an optimizing central bank, this is not true for the sub-nest containing the "detected
secret" and "pure secret" interventions , which are exclusively related to the perception of the market. Therefore, the fact
that Θ1 and Θ2 are both greater than 1 should not be of major concern.
22Table 5: Multinomial logit and Nested logit estimation
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Top variables : intervention decision (Probability of non intervention)
Constant 5.225*** 1.556*** 1.543*** 1.546 ***
[0.236] [0.089] [0.086] [0.086]
dev short -0.128 -0.009 - -
[0.188] [0.034]
dev medium -0.106 0.005 - -
[0.074] [0.015]
dev long -0.019 -0.005 - -
[0.025] [0.005]
mis -0.016 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
[0.010] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
statement -0.735*** -0.097** -0.100** -0.097**
[0.186] [0.039] [0.039] [0.039]
interventiont−1 -2.827*** -0.349*** -0.349*** -0.345***
[0.186] [0.050] [0.049] [0.048]
RVt−1 0.478*** 0.016 0.009 -
[0.181] [0.028] [0.022]
Mid variables : secrecy strategy (Probability of public intervention)
leaning 3.642*** 1.397*** 1.404*** 1.403***
[0.272] [0.082] [0.081] [0.081]
previous reported success 3.532*** 1.421*** 1.411*** 1.406***
[0.363] [0.108] [0.107] [0.106]
inconsist -0.882*** 0.454*** 0.433*** 0.439***
[0.345] [0.163] [0.155] [0.156]
Bottom variables : detection process (Probability of detection)
amount 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
coord 5.964*** 2.369*** 2.363*** 2.362***
[1.650] [0.856] [0.854] [0.854]
success 2.359*** 1.515*** 1.509*** 1.511***
[0.409] [0.217] [0.215] [0.215]
cluster -0.364 0.443*** 0.444*** 0.442***
[0.402] [0.162] [0.160] [0.161]
Inclusive values
Θ1 - 3.507*** 3.466*** 3.472***
[0.443] [0.422] [0.425]
Θ2 - 2.125*** 2.137*** 2.136***
[.246 ] [0.245] [0.245]
Log Likelikood -705.232 -505.196 -505.769 -505.871
Note: Column (1) gives the estimates of the multinomial logit speciﬁcation, while columns (2) to
(4) report the estimates of the full, semi-parsimonious and parsimonious nested logit models. The
10%, 5% and 1% levels of signiﬁcance are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively.
23Table 6: Nested logit estimation: Robustness analysis
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Top variables : intervention decision (Probability of non intervention)
Constant 1.467*** 1.525*** 1.460*** 1.403***
[0.074] [0.082] [0.078] [0.074]
misdum -0.087** - - -
[0.039]
mis - -0.005** -0.006*** -0.006***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
statement -0.094** -0.092** - -
[0.039] [0.039]
interventiont−1 -0.354*** -0.356*** -0.320*** -0.265***
[0.049] [0.049] [0.043] [0.040]
Mid Variables: secrecy strategy (Probability of public intervention)
leaning 1.423*** 1.471*** 1.203*** 1.142***
[0.082] [0.085] [0.071] [0.068]
previous reported success 1.441*** 1.413*** 1.295*** 1.231***
[0.108] [0.107] [0.098] [0.093]
inconsist 0.396*** - 0.480*** 0.453***
[0.153] [0.145] [0.116]
inconsist × mis - 0.018* - -
[0.010]
statement - - 0.418*** -
[0.062]
sum statement - - - 0.131***
[0.015]
Bottom variables: detection process (Probability of detection)
amount 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
coord 2.380*** 2.344*** 2.102*** 2.103***
[0.856] [0.852] [0.804] [0.775]
success 1.497*** 1.450*** 1.517*** 1.528***
[0.216] [0.199] [0.220] [0.218]
cluster 0.461** 0.491*** 0.448*** 0.464***
[0.159 ] [0.153] [0.150 ] [0.139]
Inclusive values
Θ1 3.457*** 3.203*** 3.564*** 3.688***
[0.420] [0.347] [0.443] [0.432]
Θ2 2.138*** 2.223*** 2.397*** 2.536***
[0.244] [0.244] [0.271] [0.283]
Log Likelikood -507.968 -511.452 -488.515 -485.675
Note: Estimates in this table correspond to robustness tests of the parsimonious nested logit
model. Column (1) considers a dummy version (misdum) of the misalignment variable. Column
(2) incorporates a continuous version of the variable measuring the inconsistency of an intervention
with respect to the objective of reducing the misalignment (inconsist × mis). Columns (3) and (4)
include the variables statement and sum statement respectively at the second level. The 10%, 5%
and 1% levels of signiﬁcance are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively.
24Second level: secrecy puzzle
As for the ﬁrst level, it is important to notice that the underlying utility of the second level depends upon
the decision to intervene publicly. That is, positive (or negative) coeﬃcients imply that an increase in
the explanatory variable tends to increase (decrease) the probability of using a public intervention (i.e.
an intervention which the central bank wants market participants to know about) and so to decrease
(increase) the probability of using a secret intervention (i.e. an intervention the central bank wants to
hide from market participants). The estimates of the parameters in the second nest are directly linked
to the secrecy puzzle in the sense that they give some information about the determinants of the choice
of secrecy.
Interestingly, the three variables considered as determinants of the choice of secrecy all turn out to
be signiﬁcant. Little evidence is revealed about the noise-trading channel as a way of explaining the use
of secret interventions by the BoJ. Indeed, while that argument would suggest that a leaning-against-
the-wind context would favor the use of secret interventions, we ﬁnd the opposite eﬀect (leaning has
a signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient). This means that when the BoJ conducts interventions to reverse a
recent trend, it tends to use public rather than secret interventions. Of course, the way the noise-trading
approach is tested in this model is quite unusual. Since central banks do not often release information
about their intervention strategies, indirect evidence has to be used to assess the presence of such a
channel. Further research is clearly needed before drawing more conclusions. Nevertheless, our rejection
of a noise-trading strategy is consistent with Neely (2006)’s ﬁndings: on average, central bankers do not
seem to believe that leaning-against-the-wind favors the use of secret interventions.
Our results on the inconsistency of the exchange rate policy and the fundamental equilibrium exchange
rate diﬀer from those obtained by Beine and Bernal (2006). Beine and Bernal (2006) found that when
the direction of an intervention is inconsistent with a reduction in the degree of misalignment, the BoJ
tended to favor the use of secret interventions. However our nested logit approach gives the opposite
result (inconsist has a signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient). The ﬁndings of the multinomial logit (column
(1) of Table 5), suggest that the previous result might be due to a failure to decompose the decision
process into sequential interdependent steps. Moreover Beine and Bernal (2006)’s results rely on the
validity of an ex ante identiﬁcation between the determinants of secrecy and those favoring the detection
of interventions. The present study, by achieving a clear distinction between the diﬀerent decision levels,
allows the identiﬁcation of the relevant determinants to come directly from the theory. Furthermore,
when large deviations of the exchange rate from the equilibrium value are taken into account, the impact
of inconsistent policies is much less signiﬁcant (see variable inconsist × mis in Table 6). This result
emphasizes the importance of the nested logit structure that allows a clear distinction between the
decision to use secret intervention and the detection process conducted by FX traders to be made. This
distinction is impossible in a multinomial logit framework or in a simple logit model of detected and
25undetected operations (as used by Beine and Bernal, 2006). The fact that inconsistency of intervention
policy leads to the use of public interventions is consistent with the hypothesis of multiple equilibria and
with the view that interventions are used in an attempt to coordinate market participants’ expectations
on an exchange rate level diﬀerent from the prevailing one. In this context, highly visible operations can
be used as a device to alter market expectations.
Our results also show that previous success tends to favor the use of public interventions (previous
reported success has a signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient). This result is in line with the idea that secrecy
may be used by central banks when their credibility has been called into question by several recent failures
in their intervention policy (Chiu, 2003). Central bankers’ opinions support this hypothesis moderately
well (Neely, 2006).
When statements are introduced at the second level (Columns (3) and (4) in Table 6), a signiﬁcant
positive correlation between statements and open interventions is established. This result holds both for
contemporaneous statements and for statements issued in the days preceding the intervention, and indi-
cates that when the BoJ conducts a more transparent policy, it tends to use more public interventions.24
Third level: detection of interventions
The third level results concern the detection of secret interventions. A positive (or negative) coeﬃcient
indicates that an increase in the independent variable increases (decreases) the probability of detecting
a secret intervention. Our estimates lead to a clear identiﬁcation of the factors favoring the detection of
interventions by FX traders. Not surprisingly, large, concerted and frequent interventions are much more
easily detected than small, unilateral and sporadic ones (amount, coord and cluster have positive sig-
niﬁcant coeﬃcients). The relevance of these three determinants is strongly supported by central bankers
(see Neely, 2006). Successful interventions are also found to be more often spotted by FX traders than
unsuccessful ones, which supports Dominguez (2004)’s conjecture (success also has a positive signiﬁ-
cant coeﬃcient). Note that the estimates of the parameters in this nest are very robust to alternative
speciﬁcations.
Implications
By modeling the whole process relative to FX intervention activity, our analysis has delivered insights
that cannot be provided by separate investigations. The value added in terms of the implications of our
work can be illustrated by two diﬀerent examples.
First, our results suggest that the central bank (the BoJ) faces diﬃcult problems when its previous
interventions have failed to deliver the desired objective. To see this, suppose that, during the previous
24Recent changes in communication regimes at the BoJ are fully consistent with these ﬁndings. Under Sakakibara’s
management (1995-2000), very few secret operations were used (see Beine and Lecourt, 2004). After this period, the BoJ
used much less oral communication and the proportion of secret operations increased strongly.
26weeks, the interventions conducted by the bank have not succeeded in moving the exchange rate in the
desired direction. In this sense, the bank has a low degree of credibility. Assume also that the exchange
rate is misaligned so that interventions are required. Our results indicate that (i) the bank will tend to
intervene and (ii) it will favor the use of secret rather than public interventions. In this situation, only
portfolio balance eﬀects can be expected to work, which in turn suggests that large currency purchasing
or selling amounts will be involved. However, large amounts increase the probability of interventions
being detected, which would undermine the secrecy strategy. As a result, the central bank faces a trade-
oﬀ over the size of its interventions. This may also explain why it might be diﬃcult to produce eﬃcient
interventions after a row of unsuccessful operations.
As a second example of the implications of this work, consider how communication policy interacts
with exchange rate policy. When a central bank tends to communicate quite often, according to our
results, it will favor public interventions. In this case, since there is no real detection process being
undertaken by traders, the central bank can buy or sell large amounts of foreign currency. This is exactly
what was observed for the BoJ during the Sakakibara period (1996-2002), when oral communication was
often used alongside large and public interventions against the USD (Ito, 2003).25
These two examples suggest that the various determinants of the intervention process interact strongly.
They show that the central bank’s decision making involves a set of decisions rather than a simple choice
(to intervene or not to intervene). A full understanding of a given exchange rate policy requires a large
set of considerations, directly and indirectly related to interventions, to be taken into account.
Conclusion
This paper has investigated the various steps undertaken by the BoJ when intervening on the YEN/USD
market. We have studied the determinants of three outcomes: (i) the decision to intervene; (ii) the use
of secret versus public interventions; and (iii) the detection of secret interventions by FX traders. The
estimation procedure is based on a nested logit speciﬁcation with three diﬀerent levels. The speciﬁcity
of this framework allows us to consider the various outcomes in an integrated framework with a clear
distinction between the levels.
Our results allow us to put previous empirical ﬁndings on the behavior of central banks in the FX
markets into perspective. On the whole, FX authorities are found to intervene to reduce misalignments
25The so-called Sakakibara period includes the period during which Dr. Sakakibara was Director General of the In-
ternational Bureau of the Ministry of Finance and therefore in charge of the FX intervention of the BoJ. This period
also includes the period of oﬃce of his successor, i.e. Mr. Kuroda who basically followed the same type of intervention
policy (see Ito and Yabu, 2004 on this). If we compare the Sakakibara period with the period between 1991 and 1995
on the one hand, and the period after 2002 on the other hand, we observe striking diﬀerences. About two thirds of the
oﬃcial statements were made during the Sakakibara period, which leads many observers to consider it as a period of high
transparency and communication. Almost all interventions during that period are found to be public, while for the other
periods, the proportions amount to 83% and 19% respectively. Finally, the average size of daily interventions amounts to
519 billions of JPY during this period, compared to 46.75 and 273.38 billions of JPY during the ﬁrst and the last period
respectively. The largest FX operation carried out by the BoJ also occurred during this period, more precisely on the 10th
of April 1998 when the BoJ sold more than 20 billions of US dollars.
27and to use their communication policy to further clarify their objectives. Once the decision to inter-
vene has been taken, the characteristics of the intervention depends on market conditions and the central
bank’s overall credibility. That is, visible operations are used when trying to reverse the prevailing trend,
while the failure of previous interventions encourages the central bank to opt for secrecy. Importantly, a
secret intervention has to remain undetected to ensure its consistency with the secrecy strategy. The way
interventions are conducted is then of overwhelming importance in inﬂuencing market participants’ de-
tection process. In this respect, our estimates suggest that a central bank trying to keep its interventions
undetected should choose to intervene unilaterally, with low amounts and in a sporadic way.
Our results also show that a full understanding of any intervention policy has to integrate a large set
of variables inﬂuencing the three levels discussed above. For instance, investing low amounts to reduce
the probability of detection of an intervention means that the portfolio and microstructure eﬀects are
deliberately weakened. In other words, the central bank worsens its chances of moving the FX trend
successfully (which is the primary objective of the intervention). This puts the focus on a potential
trade-oﬀ for the FX authorities between the necessity of inﬂuencing the exchange rate adequately, and
consistency with its general intervention strategy. Importantly, this dilemma only emerges when secrecy
is required. This might partially explain the well-known reduction in the eﬀectiveness of opaque policy.
This reasoning illustrates the necessity of adopting a global approach to analyzing central banks’
behavior. More generally, it might open the door to further research. In particular, it would be interesting
to investigate in more detail the inﬂuence of constraints such as the objectives of exchange rate and
strategy on the critical amount invested in each intervention.
Finally, while our results are speciﬁcally related to the BoJ’s intervention policy, we believe that
they shed some interesting light on key variables inﬂuencing the exchange rate policy decisions of central
banks in general. Most of the results we obtained are consistent with the opinions of a large number of
central bankers about the appropriate way to intervene in the FX markets.
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